So Sarkozy has decided to implement a ban on the burqa in public spaces in order to protect the dignity of women... Click here for the article
My question is what do we define as dignity? How can we define it?
Is it less of an affront to the dignity of Muslim women to have to wear western apparel and have men peruse the "goods" openly in the street? Most of us in the west would say that dignity = freedom, giving us the ability to make a free decision on how we spend our lives, what we are involved in, who we are to become and what we are to wear. So how is the State dictating that women are no longer free to wear their desired apparel freedom, to practice their religion? Isn't cutting off this choice more of an affront to the French Republican values?
Your thoughts on dignity, burqas and freedom?
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Monday, April 5, 2010
Human Rights and Islam
April 2010
This essay will seek to answer the question of whether Womens human rights and Islam are fundamentally inconsistent by using binary formulations. Both use the human rights instruments of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 1 and the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations (Charter);2 which sought “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”.3 The emphasis in the first and western formulation is on equal rights. I will show that this formulation is inconsistent with Historical Shari’a law but it may be possible for Womens human rights and Islam to coexist within a broader interpretation of Quranic principles. The second construction of human rights emphasizes the dignity and worth of the human person. It argues that human dignity can be attained through the pursuit of Islam, which offers self-esteem, solidarity, and eternal rewards instead of a mere theory of egalitarianism.4 In this formulation, human rights can be embraced through adhering to practices even though it may mean a breach of the strict western formulation of human rights.
1. Human Rights as Equal Rights
Shari’a Law is often equated with Islam, in fact it represents the historical understanding of the Qur'an and the Sunna, the two fundamental sources of Islam.5 Many principles of Shari’a Law are inconsistent with modern international law. Jihad directly opposes the principles of peaceful coexistence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and state non-intervention. It also disenfranchises men politically inasmuch as free speech challenging authority is not prohibited by adverse consequences will usually result, in addition, it places no limit on the rulers power.6 For women, it inhibits participation in public life7 and discriminates against them solely on the basis of their gender.
It is impossible to sever the practice of Islam from the law of Islam, and the right to practice religion is affirmed in international law8, as is the right to self-determination9 which empowers any territory to apply their law. It follows that if Historical Shari'a law is the substantive basis for Islam, it would be inconsistent with basic human rights standards and would require eradication to ensure the enjoyment of human rights.
International Law
Which raises the question that at prima facie is answered in the negative of whether we can expect Islamic States to embrace international law and custom as defined and developed by the Colonial powers. It is surprising to discover that there was significant Muslim contribution in the formulation of the UDHR,10 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights11 and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights12 which together make up the International Bill of Rights. Islamic nations involved in the twenty-year process include Lebanon, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran and Morocco.13 Their contributions related to issues surrounding freedom of religion, gender equality in marriage, social justice, indivisibility of rights, right to self-determination as well as procedure matters such as measures of implementation and the right to petition.14 International law adherence, therefore, is no longer so untenable given Islamic participation in the process. A further impediment is the fact that international law is founded in secularism. The implication stated by An-Na’im is that if secularism remains the only alternative to Shari’a, the proponents of Shari’a will be able to enlist Muslim public opinion to their side.15 An-Na’im consequently seeks a middle road between traditional Islam which is incompatible with human rights, and secularism which is incompatible with Islam.16
An-Na’im argues that Shari'a is not divine law but asserts that it was constructed for the time of Medina and not for the realities of a world of nation-states, constitutionalism and international law.17 Furthermore, the Qur’an can retain its status as the basis for modern Islamic life but its principles be adapted and interpreted for current political context and support equal citizenship despite gender, ethnic and citizenship distinctions. He raises concerns that international law has been developed by a select, western, non-Islamic few but asserts this challenge be solved through internal legitimacy. Norani Othman, a Malaysian Islamic women’s rights activist, takes a similar position that in an Islamic society, human rights require Islamic legitimacy.18 It appears a sound solution but implementation would require both belief in the legitimacy of modern Islamic law and acquiescence.
The Moroccan Moudawana
In Morocco, due to the rise of politicised Islam, feminists sought to bring about reform and began distinguishing religion from cultural traditions. They encouraged broader interpretations of the Qur’an and non-governmental organizations lobbied and gathered signatures for changes to the Personal Status Code. In 1993, King Hassan II made some changes but husbands retained their unilateral right to divorce their wives. Further reform began in 1999 when the Prime Minister announced a National Plan for the Integration of Women in Development which culminated in the adoption of the Moudawana (The Family Code) in 2004. King Mohammed VI is said to have asked:
How can society achieve progress, while women, who represent half the nation, see their rights violated and suffer as a result of injustice, violence, and marginalization, notwithstanding the dignity and justice granted them by our glorious religion?19
The Royal Commission had reviewed the Family Code laws in light of religious law, legal reasoning (itjihad), Islamic principles of fairness, and universal human rights standards.20 The Moudawana not only affirmed equality of women, but it was enacted through a democratic process affirming equality of all citizens and allowed for substantial debate and amendment before it was finally adopted by Parliament in January 2004.21 There were seven key changes:
1. It raised the minimum age of marriage for both males and females to 18 years old whilst allowing for underage marriages in certain circumstances.
2. Women now have the right to marry without the permission of a tutor.
3. Marriage partners have a separate contract with regard to property.
4. Women can make it a term of the marriage contract that their husband cannot marry another person.
5. It is now possible for both men and women to file for divorce.
6. The judiciary now play a vital role in determining how assets are divided.
7. Previously, if a divorced women remarried or moved, her husband had the legal right to take custody of the children. Under the Moudawana, the best interests of the child are now invoked, and the judiciary play a vital role in determining this.
The Moudawana is not without issues, however Moroccans are trying to adapt to the new rules.22 The majority of issues are with regard to the perception of, and belief in, the judicial process. It is slow, it favors the rich, and there is a lack of understanding in the process largely due to illiteracy and lack of education. Women can be unaware of their rights and the Judiciary requires further training to cope with increased measures of discretion.23 However, the Moudawana shows that it is possible within an Islamic nation, giving regard to Qur’anic principles, itjihad, and international human rights standards to seek to affirm the rights of women without eradicating the practice of Islam.
2. Human Rights as Dignity
The purpose of having universal human rights is to ensure that all human beings attain dignity and respect. Dignity has been defined as the quality or state of being worthy of esteem or respect; inherent nobility and worth; poise and self-respect; or Stateliness and formality in manner and appearance.24 Perhaps this definition can be applied to the Muslim context where human dignity is attained through practices that appear to be, to the west, a contravention of human rights.
Female Circumcision
Female circumcision takes different forms, in some places merely cutting the clitoris while others employ a full cliterodectomy. However in the Sudan, Pharaonic circumcision is employed and includes both cliterodectomy and infibulation.25
In the Sudan, a family’s dignity and honor are vested in the conduct of its womenfolk26 and according to Barclay, it is a common belief among male Arab Sudanese that local women are over-sexed, a condition that circumcision is intended to control.27 Infibulation certainly ensures that a girl is a virgin when she marries for the first time; it controls her sexuality and makes it less likely that she will engage in extramarital affairs.28 The ceremony for girls is much more subdued than that of the boys; but that is not to say that it is any less culturally significant. It renders her marriageable and undergoing it is a prerequisite for womanhood, of being enabled to use her one great gift, fertility.29
Furthermore in marriage, she is able to gain, for her family the Bride price, a necessity to enable her brothers to marry. Therefore this practice plays a role in social contracting in Sudanese society. Notably, the practice of Pharaonic circumcision is prohibited by orthodox Islam30 but is deeply embedded in [Sudanese] culture.31 Given the custom’s local significance we must consider what would be impacted by its relinquishment, as well as what would be gained.32 Today the impact of removing this custom from Sudanese culture would be to make women unmarriageable and it is likely they would be rejected by their communities. In contrast, undergoing circumcision allows them to gain the dignity and respect of their peers, families and communities and are able to progress within their society, into marriage and motherhood.
Alternatively this custom should not be protected merely so that the status quo is maintained. It is morally wrong to take from women the ability to enjoy sexual intercourse, without a fully informed decision, while harming them physically and psychologically. Many illnesses result mostly due to the unhygienic method and technique of this practice and therefore these societies should consider how to curb both male and female sexual appetite rather than placing the responsibility on the shoulders of women.
The idea that this practice is Islamic and practiced only by Muslims is baseless. The practices of Doctor Isaac Baker Brown indicate otherwise. Dr Brown proposed that feminine weaknesses such as certain forms of epilepsy, catalepsy, and hysteria in females) could be cured by excision of the clitoris.33 He believed that masturbation was related to the etiology of epilepsy and that excision of the clitoris would fix it.34 A Viennese surgeon noted that he didn’t hesitate to recommend the operation in cases of regular onanism.35 Furthermore, in his 1859 study, Meigs proposed the practice of the operation and cited a nine-year old nymphomaniac.36 In 1897, Thomas Allbutt stated that in cases of nervous disorder thought to be caused by an enlarged clitoris it may be necessary to amputate the clitoris or to excise the nymphae. He asserted that a highly neurotic girl, in his care, after the excision was restored from a state of chronic invalidism to one of health and usefulness.37 Today, these kinds of operations are not practiced or endorsed in the western world.
Equally, female circumcision should not be blindly attributed to Muslim societies or even to Islam. Islam does denigrate and discriminate against women on the basis of their gender and this practice can be attributed to Islam in the limited sense that Islam places disproportionate responsibility on women and assumes them as the perpetrators of promiscuity. However within Islam there are divergent views on this practice. The legal text calls it circumcision and “obligatory”, although this may be the lesser type such as cliterodectomy and not infibulation; while the contemporary imam calls it mutilation and asserts it to be forbidden.38 Therefore in some societies it is tolerated as an Islamic practice but a more rigorous study into the practice would be needed to contrast cultural beliefs and practice around the world. For the purpose of this case study, within the Sudanese context, the practice furnishes women with dignity and respect within their community.
Conclusion
As illustrated by these two case studies how we conceive human rights is significant. The broader interpretation theory aligns with the protest school of thought which contests the status quo in favor of the oppressed.39 The Moudawana illustrates that it is possible to both interpret Islam in such a way that neither erodes the strength or status of the Qur'an but also ensures, or at the minimum, seeks equal rights for women. The human rights as dignity theory aligns with deliberative theorists who view human rights as coming into existence upon societal agreement.40 In this way, the status quo of female circumcision is maintained to facilitate intermarriage and achieves human rights as dignity. However, it is fact specific where some practices such as the husbands unilateral right to divorce, discrimination on the basis of gender, and Pharaonic circumcision are inconsistent with equal rights. Yet lesser forms of female circumcision may not be a substantive human rights abuse on the face of the procedure and may be justified by their facilitation of dignity and respect.
In sum, it is possible to interpret Islam in such a way that will achieve equality and dignity for Muslim women, therefore in some cases it is not necessary to eradicate Islam in order that Muslim women might enjoy human rights.
Bibliography
Books and Journals
Allbutt, Thomas and W.S. Playfair, eds. A system of Gynecology (New York: Macmillan Company, 1897), p. 97.
An-Na’im, Abdullah Ahmed “Islamic Law, International Relations, and Human Rights: Challenge and Response” in Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 317, 1987, p 320 - 331.
An-Na’im, Abdullah Ahmed Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law (1990), p. 67 - 74.
Barclay, Harold Buuri al Lamaab: A suburban Village in the Sudan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964) p. 239.
Boddy, Janice “Womb as oasis: The Symbolic Context of Pharaonic Circumcision in Rural Northern Sudan” in The Gender Sexuality Reader (Eds Lancaster, Roger N and Micaela di Leonardo. London: Routledge, 1997. Pp. 309-324.
Brown, Isaac Baker “Review of On the Curability of Certain Forms of Insanity, Epilepsy, Catalepsy, and Hysteria in Females” in The British Medical Journal 1866 (28 April), 438-440.
Fatima Sadiqi & Moha Ennaji “ The Feminization of Public Space: Women’s Activism” in The FamiiddleastoMenstud (2006), p. 105.
Freedman, Michael “The Problem of Secularism in Human Rights Theory” in Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004) John Hopkins University Press, p. 378-380.
Higgins, J “ Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Legal, Social, and Ideological Changes, 10 Signs” in Women in Culture and Society 477 (1985).
Kecia, Ali “Reduce but Not Destroy” in Sexual Ethics and Islam: Feminist Reflections on Qur'an, Hadith and Jurisprudence” (Oxford: Oneworld Publicaitons, 2006), 98.
Meigs, Charles D Woman: Her Diseases and Remedies (Philadelphia: Blanchard and Leas, 1859), p. 151.
Othman, Norani “Grounding Human Rights Arguments in Non-Western Culture: Shari’a and the Citizenship Rights of Women in a Modern Islamic State” in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Joanne R Bauer & Daniel A Bell, eds, 1999), p. 189.
Sheehan, Elizabeth A “Victorian Clitoridectomy: Isaac Baker Brown and His Harmless Operative Procedure” in The Gender Sexuality Reader (Eds Lancaster, Roger N and Micaela di Leonardo. London: Routledge, 1997. pp. 325-334.
Waltz, Susan “Universal Human Rights: The Contribution of Muslim States” in Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004) John Hopkins University Press, pp. 799-837.
Zoglin, Katie “Morocco’s Family Code: Improving Equality for Women” in Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009) John Hopkins University Press, p. 968 - 982.
Internet Documents
Dictionary.com: Sourced 1 April 2010.
International Law: Declarations and Conventions
The Charter of the United Nations 1945 (signed 26 June 1945).
The International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights 1966
(opened for signature, ratification and accession 16 December 1966, entry into force entry into force 23 March 1976).
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966
(opened for signature, ratification and accession 16 December 1966, entry into force entry into force 23 March 1976).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (adopted and proclaimed on 10 December 1948).
This essay will seek to answer the question of whether Womens human rights and Islam are fundamentally inconsistent by using binary formulations. Both use the human rights instruments of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 1 and the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations (Charter);2 which sought “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”.3 The emphasis in the first and western formulation is on equal rights. I will show that this formulation is inconsistent with Historical Shari’a law but it may be possible for Womens human rights and Islam to coexist within a broader interpretation of Quranic principles. The second construction of human rights emphasizes the dignity and worth of the human person. It argues that human dignity can be attained through the pursuit of Islam, which offers self-esteem, solidarity, and eternal rewards instead of a mere theory of egalitarianism.4 In this formulation, human rights can be embraced through adhering to practices even though it may mean a breach of the strict western formulation of human rights.
1. Human Rights as Equal Rights
Shari’a Law is often equated with Islam, in fact it represents the historical understanding of the Qur'an and the Sunna, the two fundamental sources of Islam.5 Many principles of Shari’a Law are inconsistent with modern international law. Jihad directly opposes the principles of peaceful coexistence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and state non-intervention. It also disenfranchises men politically inasmuch as free speech challenging authority is not prohibited by adverse consequences will usually result, in addition, it places no limit on the rulers power.6 For women, it inhibits participation in public life7 and discriminates against them solely on the basis of their gender.
It is impossible to sever the practice of Islam from the law of Islam, and the right to practice religion is affirmed in international law8, as is the right to self-determination9 which empowers any territory to apply their law. It follows that if Historical Shari'a law is the substantive basis for Islam, it would be inconsistent with basic human rights standards and would require eradication to ensure the enjoyment of human rights.
International Law
Which raises the question that at prima facie is answered in the negative of whether we can expect Islamic States to embrace international law and custom as defined and developed by the Colonial powers. It is surprising to discover that there was significant Muslim contribution in the formulation of the UDHR,10 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights11 and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights12 which together make up the International Bill of Rights. Islamic nations involved in the twenty-year process include Lebanon, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran and Morocco.13 Their contributions related to issues surrounding freedom of religion, gender equality in marriage, social justice, indivisibility of rights, right to self-determination as well as procedure matters such as measures of implementation and the right to petition.14 International law adherence, therefore, is no longer so untenable given Islamic participation in the process. A further impediment is the fact that international law is founded in secularism. The implication stated by An-Na’im is that if secularism remains the only alternative to Shari’a, the proponents of Shari’a will be able to enlist Muslim public opinion to their side.15 An-Na’im consequently seeks a middle road between traditional Islam which is incompatible with human rights, and secularism which is incompatible with Islam.16
An-Na’im argues that Shari'a is not divine law but asserts that it was constructed for the time of Medina and not for the realities of a world of nation-states, constitutionalism and international law.17 Furthermore, the Qur’an can retain its status as the basis for modern Islamic life but its principles be adapted and interpreted for current political context and support equal citizenship despite gender, ethnic and citizenship distinctions. He raises concerns that international law has been developed by a select, western, non-Islamic few but asserts this challenge be solved through internal legitimacy. Norani Othman, a Malaysian Islamic women’s rights activist, takes a similar position that in an Islamic society, human rights require Islamic legitimacy.18 It appears a sound solution but implementation would require both belief in the legitimacy of modern Islamic law and acquiescence.
The Moroccan Moudawana
In Morocco, due to the rise of politicised Islam, feminists sought to bring about reform and began distinguishing religion from cultural traditions. They encouraged broader interpretations of the Qur’an and non-governmental organizations lobbied and gathered signatures for changes to the Personal Status Code. In 1993, King Hassan II made some changes but husbands retained their unilateral right to divorce their wives. Further reform began in 1999 when the Prime Minister announced a National Plan for the Integration of Women in Development which culminated in the adoption of the Moudawana (The Family Code) in 2004. King Mohammed VI is said to have asked:
How can society achieve progress, while women, who represent half the nation, see their rights violated and suffer as a result of injustice, violence, and marginalization, notwithstanding the dignity and justice granted them by our glorious religion?19
The Royal Commission had reviewed the Family Code laws in light of religious law, legal reasoning (itjihad), Islamic principles of fairness, and universal human rights standards.20 The Moudawana not only affirmed equality of women, but it was enacted through a democratic process affirming equality of all citizens and allowed for substantial debate and amendment before it was finally adopted by Parliament in January 2004.21 There were seven key changes:
1. It raised the minimum age of marriage for both males and females to 18 years old whilst allowing for underage marriages in certain circumstances.
2. Women now have the right to marry without the permission of a tutor.
3. Marriage partners have a separate contract with regard to property.
4. Women can make it a term of the marriage contract that their husband cannot marry another person.
5. It is now possible for both men and women to file for divorce.
6. The judiciary now play a vital role in determining how assets are divided.
7. Previously, if a divorced women remarried or moved, her husband had the legal right to take custody of the children. Under the Moudawana, the best interests of the child are now invoked, and the judiciary play a vital role in determining this.
The Moudawana is not without issues, however Moroccans are trying to adapt to the new rules.22 The majority of issues are with regard to the perception of, and belief in, the judicial process. It is slow, it favors the rich, and there is a lack of understanding in the process largely due to illiteracy and lack of education. Women can be unaware of their rights and the Judiciary requires further training to cope with increased measures of discretion.23 However, the Moudawana shows that it is possible within an Islamic nation, giving regard to Qur’anic principles, itjihad, and international human rights standards to seek to affirm the rights of women without eradicating the practice of Islam.
2. Human Rights as Dignity
The purpose of having universal human rights is to ensure that all human beings attain dignity and respect. Dignity has been defined as the quality or state of being worthy of esteem or respect; inherent nobility and worth; poise and self-respect; or Stateliness and formality in manner and appearance.24 Perhaps this definition can be applied to the Muslim context where human dignity is attained through practices that appear to be, to the west, a contravention of human rights.
Female Circumcision
Female circumcision takes different forms, in some places merely cutting the clitoris while others employ a full cliterodectomy. However in the Sudan, Pharaonic circumcision is employed and includes both cliterodectomy and infibulation.25
In the Sudan, a family’s dignity and honor are vested in the conduct of its womenfolk26 and according to Barclay, it is a common belief among male Arab Sudanese that local women are over-sexed, a condition that circumcision is intended to control.27 Infibulation certainly ensures that a girl is a virgin when she marries for the first time; it controls her sexuality and makes it less likely that she will engage in extramarital affairs.28 The ceremony for girls is much more subdued than that of the boys; but that is not to say that it is any less culturally significant. It renders her marriageable and undergoing it is a prerequisite for womanhood, of being enabled to use her one great gift, fertility.29
Furthermore in marriage, she is able to gain, for her family the Bride price, a necessity to enable her brothers to marry. Therefore this practice plays a role in social contracting in Sudanese society. Notably, the practice of Pharaonic circumcision is prohibited by orthodox Islam30 but is deeply embedded in [Sudanese] culture.31 Given the custom’s local significance we must consider what would be impacted by its relinquishment, as well as what would be gained.32 Today the impact of removing this custom from Sudanese culture would be to make women unmarriageable and it is likely they would be rejected by their communities. In contrast, undergoing circumcision allows them to gain the dignity and respect of their peers, families and communities and are able to progress within their society, into marriage and motherhood.
Alternatively this custom should not be protected merely so that the status quo is maintained. It is morally wrong to take from women the ability to enjoy sexual intercourse, without a fully informed decision, while harming them physically and psychologically. Many illnesses result mostly due to the unhygienic method and technique of this practice and therefore these societies should consider how to curb both male and female sexual appetite rather than placing the responsibility on the shoulders of women.
The idea that this practice is Islamic and practiced only by Muslims is baseless. The practices of Doctor Isaac Baker Brown indicate otherwise. Dr Brown proposed that feminine weaknesses such as certain forms of epilepsy, catalepsy, and hysteria in females) could be cured by excision of the clitoris.33 He believed that masturbation was related to the etiology of epilepsy and that excision of the clitoris would fix it.34 A Viennese surgeon noted that he didn’t hesitate to recommend the operation in cases of regular onanism.35 Furthermore, in his 1859 study, Meigs proposed the practice of the operation and cited a nine-year old nymphomaniac.36 In 1897, Thomas Allbutt stated that in cases of nervous disorder thought to be caused by an enlarged clitoris it may be necessary to amputate the clitoris or to excise the nymphae. He asserted that a highly neurotic girl, in his care, after the excision was restored from a state of chronic invalidism to one of health and usefulness.37 Today, these kinds of operations are not practiced or endorsed in the western world.
Equally, female circumcision should not be blindly attributed to Muslim societies or even to Islam. Islam does denigrate and discriminate against women on the basis of their gender and this practice can be attributed to Islam in the limited sense that Islam places disproportionate responsibility on women and assumes them as the perpetrators of promiscuity. However within Islam there are divergent views on this practice. The legal text calls it circumcision and “obligatory”, although this may be the lesser type such as cliterodectomy and not infibulation; while the contemporary imam calls it mutilation and asserts it to be forbidden.38 Therefore in some societies it is tolerated as an Islamic practice but a more rigorous study into the practice would be needed to contrast cultural beliefs and practice around the world. For the purpose of this case study, within the Sudanese context, the practice furnishes women with dignity and respect within their community.
Conclusion
As illustrated by these two case studies how we conceive human rights is significant. The broader interpretation theory aligns with the protest school of thought which contests the status quo in favor of the oppressed.39 The Moudawana illustrates that it is possible to both interpret Islam in such a way that neither erodes the strength or status of the Qur'an but also ensures, or at the minimum, seeks equal rights for women. The human rights as dignity theory aligns with deliberative theorists who view human rights as coming into existence upon societal agreement.40 In this way, the status quo of female circumcision is maintained to facilitate intermarriage and achieves human rights as dignity. However, it is fact specific where some practices such as the husbands unilateral right to divorce, discrimination on the basis of gender, and Pharaonic circumcision are inconsistent with equal rights. Yet lesser forms of female circumcision may not be a substantive human rights abuse on the face of the procedure and may be justified by their facilitation of dignity and respect.
In sum, it is possible to interpret Islam in such a way that will achieve equality and dignity for Muslim women, therefore in some cases it is not necessary to eradicate Islam in order that Muslim women might enjoy human rights.
Bibliography
Books and Journals
Allbutt, Thomas and W.S. Playfair, eds. A system of Gynecology (New York: Macmillan Company, 1897), p. 97.
An-Na’im, Abdullah Ahmed “Islamic Law, International Relations, and Human Rights: Challenge and Response” in Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 317, 1987, p 320 - 331.
An-Na’im, Abdullah Ahmed Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law (1990), p. 67 - 74.
Barclay, Harold Buuri al Lamaab: A suburban Village in the Sudan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964) p. 239.
Boddy, Janice “Womb as oasis: The Symbolic Context of Pharaonic Circumcision in Rural Northern Sudan” in The Gender Sexuality Reader (Eds Lancaster, Roger N and Micaela di Leonardo. London: Routledge, 1997. Pp. 309-324.
Brown, Isaac Baker “Review of On the Curability of Certain Forms of Insanity, Epilepsy, Catalepsy, and Hysteria in Females” in The British Medical Journal 1866 (28 April), 438-440.
Fatima Sadiqi & Moha Ennaji “ The Feminization of Public Space: Women’s Activism” in The FamiiddleastoMenstud (2006), p. 105.
Freedman, Michael “The Problem of Secularism in Human Rights Theory” in Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004) John Hopkins University Press, p. 378-380.
Higgins, J “ Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Legal, Social, and Ideological Changes, 10 Signs” in Women in Culture and Society 477 (1985).
Kecia, Ali “Reduce but Not Destroy” in Sexual Ethics and Islam: Feminist Reflections on Qur'an, Hadith and Jurisprudence” (Oxford: Oneworld Publicaitons, 2006), 98.
Meigs, Charles D Woman: Her Diseases and Remedies (Philadelphia: Blanchard and Leas, 1859), p. 151.
Othman, Norani “Grounding Human Rights Arguments in Non-Western Culture: Shari’a and the Citizenship Rights of Women in a Modern Islamic State” in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Joanne R Bauer & Daniel A Bell, eds, 1999), p. 189.
Sheehan, Elizabeth A “Victorian Clitoridectomy: Isaac Baker Brown and His Harmless Operative Procedure” in The Gender Sexuality Reader (Eds Lancaster, Roger N and Micaela di Leonardo. London: Routledge, 1997. pp. 325-334.
Waltz, Susan “Universal Human Rights: The Contribution of Muslim States” in Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004) John Hopkins University Press, pp. 799-837.
Zoglin, Katie “Morocco’s Family Code: Improving Equality for Women” in Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009) John Hopkins University Press, p. 968 - 982.
Internet Documents
Dictionary.com:
International Law: Declarations and Conventions
The Charter of the United Nations 1945 (signed 26 June 1945).
The International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights 1966
(opened for signature, ratification and accession 16 December 1966, entry into force entry into force 23 March 1976).
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966
(opened for signature, ratification and accession 16 December 1966, entry into force entry into force 23 March 1976).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (adopted and proclaimed on 10 December 1948).
Introducing
There are no ordinary people. You have never talked to a mere mortal. Nations, cultures, arts, civilizations--these are mortal, and their life is to ours as the life of a gnat. But it is immortals whom we joke with, work with, marry, snub, and exploit--immortal horrors or everlasting splendours. This does not mean that we are to be perpetually solemn. We must play. But our merriment must be of the kind (and it is, in fact, the merriest kind) which exists between people who have, from the outset, taken each other seriously--no flippancy, no superiority, no presumption. And our charity must be real and costly love, with deep feeling for the sins in spite of which we love the sinners--no mere tolerance, or indulgence which parodies love as flippancy parodies merriment. Next to the Blessed Sacrament itself, your neighbor is the holiest object presented to your senses. -- CS Lewis.
On this journey of learning about human rights, i thought it might be cool to start a blog that I can post thoughts, articles and essays I've written about Human Rights. The premise of all of this is that I am a learner. As such I may at times argue against my true position in order to explore all ways of thinking about human rights and to fully grasp the complexities and seemingly impossibilities. But I hope that you would
a. learn some new stuff about some of the issues I'll write about, and
b. this blog will create discussion and dialogue where we can together explore how we can protect and ensure that all human beings are loved, respected and protected.
On this journey of learning about human rights, i thought it might be cool to start a blog that I can post thoughts, articles and essays I've written about Human Rights. The premise of all of this is that I am a learner. As such I may at times argue against my true position in order to explore all ways of thinking about human rights and to fully grasp the complexities and seemingly impossibilities. But I hope that you would
a. learn some new stuff about some of the issues I'll write about, and
b. this blog will create discussion and dialogue where we can together explore how we can protect and ensure that all human beings are loved, respected and protected.
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